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Abstract. Maritime cyber security is emerging as a field as reports of cyber at-
tacks against computerized maritime systems have started arriving. Modern ves-
sels are equipped with computerized systems for navigation employing the 
Global Positioning System (GPS), known as Integrated Navigation Systems 
(INS) and Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS). This pa-
per describes a proof-of-concept attack on an INS and its integrated ECDIS, and 
reports on a demonstration of the attack on a vessel. The attack includes malware 
that acts as a man-in-the-middle intercepting and manipulating GPS coordinates. 
Furthermore, the paper discusses the feasibility of the attack, as well as counter-
measures. 
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1 Introduction 
Maritime cyber security is emerging as a potentially large concern [8,9,13,33]. Modern 
vessels are equipped with computerized systems for navigation using Global Naviga-
tion Satellite Systems (GNSS) such at the Global Positioning System (GPS). Lately, 
reports of cyber attacks against maritime systems have started arriving and have placed 
cyber security at sea on the agenda [4,7]. One type of attack is GPS spoofing, in which 
navigation systems are fooled by the transmission of false GPS signals [24,30]. In a 
recent incident, more than 20 vessels operating in the Black Sea reported receiving ob-
viously wrong GPS positions in what appears to be a massive GPS spoofing [14]. 
Maritime navigation systems connected through onboard networks are usually re-
ferred to as Integrated Navigation Systems (INS) [20]. In an INS, operator stations 
with software for displaying the vessel’s position in electronic charts – known as Elec-
tronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS) [19] – are integrated with the 
GPS and other devices such as heading sensors (gyroscope), depth sensors, Automatic 
Identification System (AIS), etc. [16] (see Fig. 1). 
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In order to build defenses, it is necessary to understand attacks. In this paper we 
report on a proof-of-concept attack on an INS, and the practical demonstration of the 
attack conducted on a vessel in cooperation with the Royal Norwegian Navy (RNoN).1 
The main feature of the attack is to infect the ECDIS software on an operator sta-
tion with malware that acts as a man-in-the-middle intercepting and manipulating in-
coming coordinates from the GPS. This can be seen as a kind of GPS spoofing that 
does not interfere with the signals of the GPS satellites, but with the internal signaling 
of the INS. In addition the malware can crash the operator station by provoking a 
bluescreen. The system on which the attack was demonstrated is air-gapped, i.e. with-
out an Internet connection; a USB Human Interface Device (HID) attack is therefore 
used for delivery. The attack is rather crude, but we believe that it demonstrates the 
feasibility of this kind of attacks. To some degree, the attack depends on bad security 
of maritime systems. Several reports available indicate that there are large cyber secu-
rity challenges in the maritime sector (see e.g. [4,7,10,26]). Such reports are usually 
produced by security companies, which may have an interest in exaggerating the situ-
ation, but on the other hand we should also expect underreporting of incidents. In the 
absence of more systematic studies the overall state of cyber security at sea is un-
known. The attack presented in this paper nonetheless highlights the need for maritime 
cyber security, and also what can be gained (security wise) from implementing rela-
tively simple security measures. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We first give a brief presenta-
tion of the INS in question and some of its main features (Section 2). This is followed 
by a detailed presentation of the attack and its development, structured after the intru-
sion kill chain model of Hutchins et al. [17], including a report from the practical 
demonstration of the attack [15] (Section 3). After presenting the attack, we discuss 
possible further developments (Section 4), as well as the feasibility of the attack and 
possible counter-measures (Section 5). Finally, we provide conclusions (Section 6). 
2 Integrated Navigation System (INS) 
The INS in question, illustrated in Fig. 1, is a network that connects a number of oper-
ator stations (bridge consoles) with the sensors of the vessel. The diagram shows the 
sensors, such as the Global Positioning System, the Gyro System, the Automatic Iden-
tification System and so forth, connected to a sensor integrator (SINT) through serial 
connections (blue lines). The operator stations are connected to the same SINT through 
switches in a Dual LAN (red lines). The Dual LAN is two parallel Ethernets of which 
one is a backup, thus providing redundancy. As a second redundancy feature, the oper-
ator stations also have serial connections to the SINT (thin blue lines). The role of the 
                                                        
1  The INS and ECDIS in question are anonymized per request of the provider. The owner of 
the vessel and the provider of its INS supported the project and had representatives participat-
ing in the planning, the reconnaissance and the practical demonstration. The provider of the 
INS has been offered all information concerning the attack and has approved of the publica-
tion of this paper. 
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SINT is to receive signals from the sensors and communicate them to the operator sta-
tions in a common format, thus providing a single source of sensor data. In addition the 
SINT integrates an autopilot (AP). The operator stations are regular desktop computers 
running ECDIS software on top of the Windows operating system. The ECDIS software 
interprets the signals received form the SINT and uses information such as GPS coor-
dinates and AIS messages to render the vessel’s position and heading, as well as the 
position of nearby vessels, in the chart. 
 
Fig. 1. Schematic of the INS from the vessel’s documentation (courtesy of RNoN) 
3 Attack 
The intrusion kill chain [17] is a tool developed for analyzing cyber attacks. It provides 
a model that describes the work process of an attacker seeking to infiltrate computer 
system in seven phases: reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, instal-
lation, command and control, and actions on objectives. Thus, while the model is de-
veloped as an aid to the defender it utilized the waypoint of the attacker. This makes it 
a good tool also for describing the development of an attack, because it will highlight 
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the assumptions and choices made, and the resources needed, in the development. In 
the following we explain our attack in detail according to the seven phases of the intru-
sion kill chain. At the end of the section we report from a demonstration of the attack. 
3.1 Reconnaissance 
In our reconnaissance efforts, we had four main sources of information: 
1. A field trip was conducted on board a vessel identical to the vessel on which the 
demonstration was to take place. During this field trip we observed the workings of 
the system and had the opportunity to ask questions to representatives of the owner 
of the vessel and the provider of the INS. 
2. During the field trip, we also had the opportunity to monitor and capture data traffic 
on the INS network while the vessel was sailing. This was achieved simply by plug-
ging a regular laptop computer with Wireshark installed into a spare port in the 
switch using a network cable. 
3. We obtained a laptop with the ECDIS software installed. 
4. We were given access to technical documentation of the INS installation of the ves-
sels. 
In addition, some testing and troubleshooting was performed on a second field trip 
when the attack was demonstrated. The likelihood of an attacker being able to perform 
the same kind of reconnaissance is discussed in Section 5.1. 
From the field trip we learned that operator stations are running Windows 7 and 
logged in with user profiles with administrator privileges. Inspection of the ECDIS 
software on the laptop we obtained showed that it uses Windows Sockets 2.0 
(Winsock) for network communication. Inspection of its configuration files, held to-
gether with the documentation, gave useful information about the configuration of the 
network, e.g. that all nodes have static IP addresses. This, together with the network 
traffic capture, also told us the IP addresses of the network and port numbers used in 
the communication. Analysis of the network traffic capture revealed the format of the 
SINT signals, which turned out to be User Datagram Protocol (UDP) multicasts of 
plaintext messages formatted according to the NMEA 0183 standard, usually referred 
to as NMEA sentences. For learning the details of NMEA sentences we used more or 
less arbitrary Internet source [5,36]. 
3.2 Weaponization 
The payload of the attack consists of two parts: a fake Windows socket dynamic-link 
library (Winsock DLL) and a script that crashes the computer by provoking a 
bluescreen. The fake Winsock DLL is a proxy for the proper Winsock DLL 
(ws2_32.dll) developed using available skeleton code [2]. It acts as a man-in-the-
middle between the proper DLL and the ECDIS software, inspecting and manipulating 
data packages received from the network. The SINT transmits the NMEA sentences as 
ASCII plaintext; an NMEA sentence with GPS coordinates is of the following format: 
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 $GPGGA,083548.53,6022.10378,N,00510.06015,E,1,11,0.8, 
  54.74,M,,M,,*71 
The letter code at the start (GPGGA) identifies the sentence as one carrying a GPS po-
sition. Identifying and changing the coordinate (60°22.10’ N, 5°10.06’ E) is straightfor-
ward; the ECDIS software will accept a modified sentence as long as the checksum at 
the end (*71 in the example) is recalculated. 
The other part of the payload is a script that causes a bluescreen. It utilizes the 
PsKill application of the Windows Sysinternals package [32] to kill an essential system 
process (the Client/Server Runtime Subsystem, csrss.exe). The script itself is writ-
ten in VBScript, as are all other scripts used in the attack. The reason for this choice 
(as opposed to using for example PowerShell) is to make the attack compatible with 
basic installations of both Windows XP and Windows 7 as both Windows versions are 
commonly used as platforms for ECDIS applications [10,23,25]. 
Crucial for the development of the payload was the setup of a test environment. 
We used VMware software to virtualize the laptop with the ECDIS software installed 
and put it in a virtual network with a simple SINT simulator – a Debian VM running 
a small Python script generating UDP multicasts containing NMEA sentences with 
GPS coordinates. 
3.3 Delivery 
For delivery of the payload we made a device consisting of a Teensy microcontroller 
[29], a USB flash drive and a USB hub. Utilizing the possibility of programming the 
Teensy microcontroller to simulate a USB keyboard and a USB mouse at the same time, 
we developed a so-called USB HID attack (see e.g. [28]). The delivery is in three phase: 
1. The ECDIS software has a built in key capturing feature that prevents keyboard 
shortcuts (such as Windows key + R to get the Windows Run dialog) from being 
effective. This is circumvented by simulating keyboard and mouse to enter a mainte-
nance password which allows this feature to be disabled. (Some considerations on 
the passwords of the system are made in Section 5.1.) 
2. With the key capturing feature disabled, the simulated keyboard uses keyboard 
shortcuts to open a command prompt. In the command prompt it uses command line 
tools to make necessary changes to the computer, as well as to type, save and run a 
small script. 
3. The script identifies the USB flash drive and obtains the payload from it. 
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Fig. 2. Prototype USB delivery device consisting of a Teensy microcontroller, a USB flash drive 
and a USB hub 
The choice for this means of delivery was based on the assumption that the INS is 
air-gapped. Thus, it was necessary with a method based on some form of physical ac-
cess. Using simulated keyboard and mouse have the benefit that we do not need to 
assume an exploitable vulnerability in the operating system or other software. Further-
more, we could not rely on downloading the payload through the Internet. Having the 
simulated keyboard type the whole payload would take an unacceptable amount of 
time. (In a test, the simulated keyboard needed approximately seven and a half minutes 
to type a Base64 encoding of the 161 kB payload.) To avoid this, the choice fell on 
combining the Teensy with a USB flash drive though a USB hub. The (prototype) de-
vice is shown in Fig. 2. 
The scenario for application of this means of delivery would be for the attacker to 
discretely insert the device into a USB socket on one of the operator stations during a 
visit on the bridge of a vessel. Other means of delivery that we believe may work are 
discussed in Section 4.1. 
3.4 Exploitation 
The attack does not exploit technical vulnerabilities in the operating system or other 
software. The vulnerabilities exploited in the delivery is the fact that the target computer 
by default is logged in with a user profile with administrator privileges, combined with 
physical access and knowledge of the maintenance password of the ECDIS software. 
The attack itself exploits the possibility of tricking the ECDIS software into loading the 
fake Winsock DLL in what is sometimes called a DLL search order hijacking attack 
(see e.g. [12]). 
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3.5 Installation 
A common way of installing malware is to first deliver a small program or script which 
downloads the main payload via an Internet connection, a so-called dropper. However, 
we worked under the assumption that the target system is air-gapped. In the attack we 
therefore have the simulated keyboard deliver the dropper – by typing, saving and ex-
ecuting a script – and then have the dropper copy the payload – a zip file – from the 
USB flash drive to the hard drive of the target computer and unzipping it. A combina-
tion of keystrokes from the simulated keyboard and scripts contained in the payload 
then accomplishes the installation: The fake Winsock DLL is copied to the installation 
folder of the ECDIS software, and the registry of the computer is updated to exclude 
Winsock from KnownDLLs in order to trick the software into loading the fake DLL. 
(KnownDLLs is a mechanism for ensuring that certain standard DLLs are loaded from 
the Windows distribution, see e.g. [12].) In addition, a scheduled task is created that 
runs a script for provoking bluescreens. (The bluescreen script is described in more 
detail in Section 3.7). Finally, the computer is restarted to make the changes come into 
effect; the default user profile is automatically logged in and the ECDIS application 
launched on startup. In the demonstration of the attack (see Section 3.8) the time used 
by the full delivery and installation was 5 minutes, 17 seconds, including restart of the 
computer and the ECDIS software which took 2 minutes, 26 seconds. This means the 
time used by the USB device was 2 minutes, 51 seconds, but there is a potential for 
optimizing the process. We believe the time used by this first part (i.e. the time the USB 
device has to remain in the USB socket) can be reduced by approximately one and a 
half minutes. The installation is visible, but one option for preventing this could be to 
have the device dim the screen as its first action. 
3.6 Command and Control 
As the target system is air-gapped, the attack does not rely on any command and control 
mechanisms. However, in Section 4.2 we discuss a possibility of devising a simple form 
of command and control without violating the assumption that the system is air-gapped. 
3.7 Actions on Objectives 
When installed, the attack can perform two kinds of actions: It can manipulate GPS 
coordinates received from the SINT via the network and it can provoke the operator 
station to crash with a bluescreen. The manipulation of GPS coordinates is performed 
by adding a small accumulating (positive or negative) deviation to the latitude, longi-
tude or both, each time an NMEA sentence carrying GPS coordinates is received. A 
bluescreen, as mentioned above, is provoked by the killing of an essential system pro-
cess. 
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Fig. 3. Illustration of test run during the demonstration 
Both actions are triggered by the position of the vessel. The intercepted GPS coor-
dinates are compared to a set of specified triggering conditions, essentially rectangles 
defined by northern, southern, eastern and western limits. In the case of the GPS ma-
nipulation, the deviation will grow with a specified value every time a new GPS coor-
dinate is received (approximately twice each second) as long as the received coordi-
nates are within the specified limits. Outside of the limits the deviation will still be 
added to the coordinates, but as a constant. In the case of the bluescreen, a file is written 
to the hard drive of the computer if the triggering conditions are met. A script running 
every minute (activated by a scheduled task) checks the presence of the file, and if the 
file exists performs the process kill that provokes the bluescreen. 
3.8 Demonstration 
Both parts of the attack, as well as the delivery, were successfully demonstrated in four 
test runs during a passage in the littoral waters outside of Bergen, Norway in late August 
2017. The vessel is equipped with several operator stations (see Fig. 1); by infecting 
one of them with the malware we could compare an infected and an uninfected operator 
station during the test runs. A typical test run is illustrated in Fig. 3. We specified two 
trigger positions. At the first trigger position the malware started accumulating the de-
viation, and thus the position shown in the ECDIS software started drifting from the 
actual track. At the second triggering position the malware provoked a bluescreen 
which made the operation station crash. 
Actual track
Trigger position 1
Bluescreen
Trigger position 2
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Fig. 4. Route plotted by ECDIS software using GPS data. Uninfected operator station to the left, 
infected operator station to the right 
Fig. 4 shows the route plotted by the GPS in one of the test runs (in which the 
bluescreen was not tested) – uninfected operator station to the left and infected opera-
tor station to the right. In this test run the deviation grew by approximately 0.8 m to-
ward north and 0.4 m toward east per second. 
4 Further Development 
The attack as implemented utilizes a specific vector of delivery and has no command 
and control structure. Both are in a sense features of the attack that are separate from 
its core, which is the manipulation of GPS data. In this section we examine how the 
attack may be developed further by using other means of delivery or by implementing 
a command and control structure. 
4.1 Delivery 
Our means of delivery was a special USB device that in any realistic scenario must be 
brought wittingly to the bridge of the vessel under attack by an agent. However, it 
should be worth considering other methods of delivery that do not have this require-
ment. The most obvious would be to make a malware that can spread via USB flash 
drives. For example, a case in which an ECDIS computer on board a large tanker was 
infected by malware when charts were updated using an infected USB flash drive has 
been reported [4]. Another obvious option would be to utilize an Internet connection. 
We developed the attack for a vessel on which the network is air-gapped, and tradition-
ally such systems have been air-gapped due to lack of good Internet connections at sea. 
This is however changing, and navigation systems are now increasingly being equipped 
with Internet connections over satellite and/or 4G broadband (for use when sailing close 
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to shore) [4,7,10,25]. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated how this can be exploited 
to launch attacks [10,34]. 
A perhaps less obvious attack vector can be illustrated by tests we did during our 
reconnaissance when we plugged a laptop computer into the switch of the INS. This 
possibility is a common feature since stand-alone laptops are often used to plan routes, 
which are later transferred to the operator stations using the network. We were able to 
communicate (using e.g. Ping and nmap) with the other computers in the network after 
assigning our laptop a static IP address in the range used by the network. Clearly, there 
is a potential for using an external computer plugged to the network as a vector for 
delivery. Similarly, there would be a potential for the malware to spread between op-
erator stations connected to the network. 
4.2 Command and Control 
In the attack we used the reception of specific GPS coordinates as a trigger for the 
malware to perform certain actions. However, we could easily have used any other in-
formation transmitted on the network by the SINT as the triggering condition. In our 
virtual test environment, we have demonstrated how the Automatic Identification Sys-
tem (AIS) can be used to develop a simple kind of command and control. AIS is an 
automated tracking system used extensively in the maritime world for exchange of in-
formation for anti-collision purposes. Ships and land-based stations equipped with AIS 
transceivers broadcast AIS messages containing static information (identity, vessel 
type, etc.) as well as voyage related (destination) and dynamic information (position, 
heading, speed) using the VHF spectrum [27]. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the INS integrates 
AIS. The ECDIS software of the operator stations receives AIS messages from the 
SINT and renders information from nearby ships in the navigation charts. An AIS mes-
sage is basically a number of values packed in a bit string. This bit string is encoded as 
ASCII characters in a fashion similar to Base64 encoding and transmitted as part of an 
NMEA sentence [31]. We had the fake Winsock DLL inspect AIS messages received 
from the simulated SINT and use the reception of specific vessel names as the triggering 
condition. We also encoded encrypted commands into AIS messages to make the mal-
ware on an operator station trigger bluescreens, change its triggering conditions, write 
to the hard drive and execute commands. We believe that constructing an AIS trans-
ceiver to transmit such coded messages would be doable given moderate resources, see 
[3]. Furthermore, the AIS on the vessel gets certain kinds of information, e.g. the spec-
ified destination, from the ECDIS software via the network and the SINT. Even though 
it was not tested, we believe this can be exploited to have the malware make the AIS 
transmit simple messages, e.g. to acknowledge received commands. The downside of 
this means of command and control is the relatively low bitrate of AIS which makes 
transfer of large files or data unpractical. (AIS uses two channels each with a bit rate of 
9.6 kbits/s, but due to overhead, data encoding and conflict resolution the practical 
transfer rate is at least an order of magnitude lower [21]). 
As mentioned in the previous section, navigation systems with Internet connec-
tions are becoming more common. In addition to providing another vector for delivery, 
this obviously opens up for other methods of command and control. 
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5 Feasibility and Counter-Measures 
The attack was made under certain assumptions; the feasibility of the attack obviously 
depends on their validity. In the following we discuss the feasibility of the attack in the 
view of these assumptions. First, however, it should be recognized that the attack was 
successfully tested on an INS installation on a vessel without any prior modification of 
the system to make the attack work. Furthermore, the attack did not exploit any known 
or unpatched vulnerabilities in the installation. This in itself should demonstrate that 
the attack is possible. The question of the feasibility of the attack is therefore a question 
of whether we had unreasonable good intelligence and access, and a question of the 
effectiveness of barriers and counter-measures and to what degree they are imple-
mented. We will discuss these two questions in turn. 
5.1 Reconnaissance 
It cannot be denied that we were given an excellent opportunity with access to software, 
documentation, network traffic, a full installation and experts on the system. On the 
other hand, these systems are commercially available and any actor could get the same 
access given sufficient resources. It would certainly be achievable for a state actor or a 
large criminal organization. The only piece of information used in the attack that we 
would not be able to obtain by buying an installation of the system is the maintenance 
password used to bypass the key capturing functionality. How easy it would be to obtain 
this password illegitimately will of course be speculation. The use of shared or role 
based passwords, as well as relying on access control implemented at the application 
level rather than the operating system, are considered security challenges in the context 
of industrial control systems (SCADA systems) [22]; these worries should carry over 
to navigation systems. However, research on password use suggests that password 
mechanisms should reflect the nature of the resources protected in order to avoid un-
dermining the mechanism. Thus, using shared passwords to protect shared resources 
such as shared information or shared tasks can be an appropriate means of protection 
[1]. On the other hand, it has been found that shared passwords sometimes are weak 
and long lived since the challenges of managing shared passwords discourages good 
password practices [18], and that users may be more willing to disclose shared pass-
words [35]. 
5.2 Barriers and Counter-Measures 
As described in Section 3.4 the attack does not exploit technical vulnerabilities. As it 
turns out, the security of the target INS installation relies heavily on air-gapping and 
physical protection while the INS itself is quite open once access is established. It is 
however commonly accepted that this strategy in itself does not provide sufficient se-
curity and that the troubles of keeping such systems up do date will contribute to un-
dermine their security [6,22]. In this section we explore various ways to counter the 
attack, apart from the air-gapping and the physical security. 
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Security Mechanisms. The operator station under attack was logged in with a user 
profile with administrator privileges. This was exploited to copy files to the installation 
folder of the ECDIS software, to make changes to the registry and to create scheduled 
tasks. The obvious counter-measure is to create a user profile with a more restricted set 
of privileges for use in the daily operation of the system. This would force the attacker 
to device a more sophisticated attack with privilege escalation, unless he/she had access 
to the administrator password (which will have many of the same issues as the ECDIS 
maintenance password; see Section 5.1). A similar counter-measure would be to disable 
the Windows Script Host, which is used to execute VBScript. 
The operator station did not have anti-virus software installed. According to state-
ments from experts on maritime cyber security this is quite common for INS installa-
tions [4]. On the other hand, it is not certain that an anti-virus program would be suf-
ficient to detect and prevent the attack. We submitted our payload to VirusTotal 
(www.virustotal.com), and only two out of the 60 antivirus programs the service uses 
to analyze submissions flagged it as unsafe while the remaining 58 flagged it as clean. 
More advanced counter-measures would include mechanisms to prevent the fake 
DLL from loading, and some mechanism to preserve the integrity of the network traf-
fic such as cryptographic signing by the SINT. (See [25] for further discussion on the 
latter option.) 
Redundancy. The INS implements several redundancy features. While these can be 
considered safety mechanisms, it is still interesting to see if they have any impact on 
our attack. There are three source of redundancy: A duplication of the LAN, different 
sensors providing overlapping information, and sensors with serial connections to the 
operator stations. The dual LAN does not affect the attack since the Winsock DLL reads 
the network traffic of both LANs. The INS integrates several sensors in addition to the 
GPS that are also used for positioning such as heading and speed sensors. If the devia-
tion between the GPS position and dead reckoning based on other sensors exceeds a 
limit, the ECDIS software will sound a Position Deviation Alarm and this may give an 
indication that there is something wrong with the integrity of the position data. On the 
other hand, data from the other sensors are transmitted over the network in the same 
way as the GPS data. It would probably not be very difficult to have the malware ma-
nipulate also these data to remove or reduce the deviation from the manipulated GPS 
data. 
The last of the redundancy mechanisms, however, poses a challenge for the at-
tacker. The INS installation on which we tested the attack also has sensors connected 
to the operator stations using serial connections (seen as the thin blue lines connecting 
the operator stations to the SINT in Fig. 1). The ECDIS software compares GPS data 
received over the LAN with GPS data received over the serial connection and sounds 
the Position Deviation Alarm if the deviation between the two sources of GPS data 
exceeds a limit. This alarm was in fact sounded during the test runs of our demonstra-
tion. To avoid this deviation, the malware would have to manipulate also serial input 
to the ECDIS software. Since serial input seems to be handled by DLLs, a strategy 
similar to the manipulation of network traffic should be feasible. However, it would 
require a more sophisticated malware as manipulation of data across DLLs would need 
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to be synchronized in some way. An even more sophisticated (but also less feasible) 
alternative would be a malware installed on the SINT and manipulating the serial input 
there. On the other hand, the Position Deviation Alarm will only notify the operator 
that there are discrepancies in the positioning data and will not reveal this as the result 
of malware. 
6 Conclusions 
Maritime cyber security is an emerging field, and still the state of cyber security at sea 
is shrouded behind speculation and anecdotes. There is a need for studies of the con-
crete systems and threats which populate the maritime domain. Our contribution re-
ported in this paper is the development and demonstration of a cyber attack against an 
Integrated Navigation System (INS). 
We were able to successfully manipulate the GPS position displayed in the ECDIS 
application of a vessel during a passage. The attack was tailored to the INS and ECDIS 
delivered by a specific vendor (i.e. the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) of 
the INS and ECDIS of the vessel). However, a survey of navigation systems shows 
that many characteristics are shared across vendors and that the INS and ECDIS stud-
ied in this paper are fairly typical [25]. We therefore argue that the principles of the 
attack will apply also to other INS and ECDIS and that similar attacks can be imple-
mented independently of the specific INS and ECDIS products. The attack demon-
strated in this paper can in this sense be seen as a representative of a type of attacks 
against INS and ECDIS. 
To the best of our knowledge this kind of attack is novel. Though, cyber attacks 
manipulating positions displayed in electronic charts have been suggested earlier 
[11,23], and a demonstration similar to ours was reported in December 2017 [34]. Be-
ing a proof-of-concept, the attack has a certain lack of sophistication. However, the 
investment was less than two person-months of work including the reconnaissance 
phase; with more resources invested we believe this kind of attack could pose a real 
threat. On the positive side, we have seen that a combination of technical security 
measures, physical protection and security policies in many cases can prevent such 
attacks. 
Developing the attack, rather than merely speculating, serves to make explicit its 
feasibility, consequences and counter-measures. In this paper, these are discussed from 
a technical perspective. Feasibility, consequences and countermeasures of the attack 
as seen from the perspectives of navigation and maritime operations are discussed 
elsewhere [15]. These discussions highlight how maritime cyber security in some re-
spects is similar to cyber security in general and resembles security of SCADA sys-
tems, and how it in some respects is a domain that requires domain specific knowledge 
of both attacker and defender. 
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